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Sticks, Carrots and all the Rest:
Lombardy and the Spanish strategy in
Northern Italy between Europe and the
Mediterranean (part. 1)
Mario Rizzo
1 First of all, why Lombardy? Lombardy (the so-called State of Milan) was an inland region,
while all the other Spanish dominions in Italy were islands (Sicily and Sardinia) or coastal
areas (the Kingdom of Naples and the so-called Stato dei Presidi in Tuscany):1 at first glance,
these  regions  constituted  the  real  ‘Mediterranean  component’  in  Spanish  Italy.
 Nevertheless, Lombardy was profoundly important to the strategy developed within the
Mediterranean theatre of arms. 
2 By analysing Lombardy, we can learn a lot about the strategy of the Spanish Habsburg
Empire, a most typical example of those early modern ‘composite states separated from each
other by other states, or by the sea’.2 Given Milan’s crucial role in the military history of early
modern Europe, the case study of sixteenth-century Lombardy provides some interesting
perspectives on the development of general strategic issues.
3 I will briefly refer to modern strategic thinking, in order to explain an approach that
could be defined as a more strategic one, in comparison with others mainly focusing on
war in itself. In particular, I wish to highlight a trend to emphasize phases during which
strategic actors are not directly involved in conventional open war – that is to say in
battlefield conflicts, in campaigns on land and sea, sieges and the like – but nevertheless
are deeply engaged in the prosecution of their strategic aims.3 This approach requires the
examination of a wide variety of factors and instruments of policy, many of which cannot
be defined as merely or even predominantly military in nature, but which nonetheless
strongly affect strategy and conflict.4
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4 The preparation for war should be briefly examined, as it clearly plays a vital role in any
military  strategy.  Mobilization  employs  increasingly  large  resources  and  therefore
requires correspondingly large administrative preparations and financial outlays; it also
forces the state or government to adapt itself to the different conditions of wartime. Yet
the preparation for war often aims at political and diplomatic objectives, rather than at
merely military goals. In other words, its real objective is frequently to avert war itself.5 
5 Many aspects of long-term strategic activity – the consolidation of alliances among states,
the  deployment  of  naval  forces,  the  maximization  of  resources,  the  promotion  of
technological innovations, the support and encouragement given to industries producing
weapons – often seem aimed at preventing war by demonstrating a state’s capacity to
win. In other words, they deter the enemy. This is to say that the practical consequence of
mobilization for war is often to extend a state’s diplomatic and geopolitical influence by
demonstrating its military strength. Not surprisingly, the term ‘strategy’, which originally
had the naked meaning of ‘the management of military operations’, has gradually evolved
to indicate ‘the comprehensive utilization of a state’s military power for political or diplomatic
purposes’, thus becoming an essential element of international politics and diplomacy.6 
6 In order to appraise strategic choices made by international powers, we cannot simply
estimate their actual military strength as demonstrated in the fighting to which they
commit  themselves.  We must  also  take into consideration diplomatic,  economic,  and
financial initiatives, those allurements and incentives dangled before other actors, as well
as deception, dissimulation, and propaganda.7
7 The complexity of strategy and the interaction between what has been called ‘hard’ and
‘soft’ power are basic issues in Joseph S. Nye, Jr’s The Paradox of American Power. Why the
World’s Only Superpower Can’t Go It Alone (Oxford, 2002). ‘Military and economic power,’ he
argues,  ‘are both examples  of  hard power,  which can be used to persuade others  to
change their positions. Hard power can be based on menace (the stick) or inducement
(the carrot). Yet there is also an indirect way to exert power’, since a country can achieve
its  goals  in  foreign  policy  because  other  countries  follow  its  political  or  economic
blueprint and share its values. This is soft power, which has to do with ‘intangible sources
of power, such as culture, ideology, and institutions able to appeal to others’.8 
8 In this respect, we should recall the revealing words of Tommaso Campanella, who – like
other theorists such as Giovanni Botero and Baltasar Álamos de Barrientos – was ‘much
exercised by the problem of how to conserve a composite monarchy’.9 Pondering over the
problem of how to conserve amity between Spain and Italy, Campanella wrote that ‘it is
necessary to deal with Naples and Milan in such a way, that the neighbouring peoples admire them
as happy states and wish to be like them’.10 In Nye’s view, soft and hard power are deeply
connected; they may reciprocally strengthen one another. The same forms of power may
influence all levels of strategic thinking and conduct, ranging from coercion to appeal.11 
9 Complexity is a major characteristic of modern strategic thought; indeed the concept of
Grand  Strategy  has  emerged  and  is  nowadays  prevalent  in  modern  approaches  to
international relations. Grand Strategy examines and encompasses times of both war and
peace, or at least of ‘non-war’,12 and implies a broad variety of interacting issues. 13 Notice,
for instance, the meaningful title of an important book edited by Paul Kennedy in 1991:
Grand Strategies in War and Peace. 
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10 Here Grand Strategy is defined as an effort made by powers in order ‘to integrate their
overall  political,  economic,  and military aims and thus to preserve their  long-term interests’.14
Williamson  Murray  and  Mark  Grimsley  emphasize  the  protean  nature  of  strategy  –
defined as a process of ‘constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world
where chance, uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate’15 – and examine the multifarious factors
which come into play: material and non-material, objective and subjective, quantitative
and qualitative.16 
11 Significantly, ‘reality weds strategic planning tightly to its larger context. Political objectives play
their role … as do diplomatic, economic, and military resources. These elements are quite obvious,
but other factors also influence strategic thinking in subtler but equally vital ways. Geography ...
Historical experience ...  ideology and culture ...  the nature of a government’s organization’.17 In
particular, by pointing out the significance of institutional factors, Murray and Grimsley
bring to our attention a crucial issue – the interaction of internal and external spheres.
Certainly,  the  extreme  complexity  of  the  dialogue  between  ‘domestic’  and  ‘exterior’
issues had an enormous relevance to the rulers of sixteenth-century Lombardy.18
12 As Max Weber has explained, all political formations ‘are organisms using force. But the mode
and the degree in which force is used or threatened towards the external world, towards other
similar formations, have a specific importance for the structure and destiny of political entities’.19 
If, on the one hand, international relations are strongly shaped by the nature of the units
forming the international system, so on the other hand international relations in turn
influence the internal affairs and development of the units in a variety of ways.20 This is
utterly evident if we consider billeting and fiscal reforms in the State of Milan, interesting
examples  of  how the  demands  of  war  and  strategy  could  influence  institutions  and
economy in a most profound way.21
13 In composite monarchies ‘securing an equitable apportionment of the costs of war and defence’
was a most critical issue,22 as the Lombard case clearly demonstrates. Managing billeting
in Lombard territories was anything but an easy task for the Habsburg government in
Milan. To a certain extent, it might be seen as the epitome of the complexity of Spanish
Grand Strategy, which peculiarly intermingled hard and soft power, sticks and carrots.
The thousands of soldiers passing through and trained in Lombardy were one of the
principal manifestations of Spain’s military power on land. 
14 Indeed, these legions were a powerful stick, whose mere existence (together with the
regular garrison troops serving in Lombardy) acted as a political and strategic deterrent
both for the subjects of the State of Milan and for neighbouring polities. On the other
hand, their management entailed an astonishingly wide range of crucial questions going
far beyond the merely military sphere, such as the nature and perception of the relations
between the king and his subjects, the ideology of royal justice, the distribution of the
fiscal burden among the various territorial and social bodies of the State of Milan, the
conflicts  between  cities  and  contadi (rural  bodies),  and  the  relationship  between
agricultural productivity and the billeting system. 
15 Consequently and not surprisingly, billeting required the government to adopt a highly
sophisticated approach, one which – within a global strategic framework characterized by
uncertainty, interdependence, ambiguity, and mutability – was to strive to balance harsh
and binding military needs with a more prudent consideration of the onerous economic,
social,  political,  and fiscal  consequences upon Lombardy of  sustained involvement in
Spanish strategy.23 In order to exploit  fully  its  matchless  military hard power (which
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supplied Spanish strategy with priceless sticks), Madrid was frequently obliged to resort
to carrots and soft power: this was the real essence of Grand Strategy itself.
16 Raymond Aron has put forward a comprehensive assessment of modern international
relations, one which proves to be stimulating and relevant even for those historians who
focus their attention on the early modern period. He stresses the interaction of internal
and external considerations in shaping strategy. In Aron’s view, the peculiar anarchy
characterizing international relations compels the actors on the international stage to
estimate the forces they could reasonably rely on in case of war, which implies references
to the space occupied by the actors, the population, the economic resources they can
count on, the military system, the mobilization factor typical of each actor, the nature of
weapons. Military systems and weapons, in their turn, are expressions of political and
social systems. … The estimate of the available forces refers to number, space, resources,
regimes (military, economic, political, and social). These elements, in their turn, form the
stake of the conflicts among states.24
17 As a consequence, to isolate a system of international relations from the wider panorama
of historical development would be utterly fallacious, since ‘the behaviour of actors driven
by estimates of forces is determined by economic, political, social variables’25 – once again, a clear
statement of how inadequate a strictly military approach to strategy would be.
18 To a certain extent the need for such estimates was one of the reasons that led the Madrid
government  to  set  up  the  very  complex  machinery  of  the  visitas  generales (general
inspections) of the Italian dominions. These uncommonly broad and accurate inspections
assessed the whole government of the province in question and were usually conducted
over  a  number  of  years.  Certainly  they  were  the  offspring  of  a  deep-rooted  Iberian
tradition of governmental control26 and were deeply connected with the ideology and the
practice of the rey justiciero (the king providing justice to his subjects).27
19  Moreover, they played an important role in the relationship between the centre and the
periphery of the Empire, and between clients and patrons.28 But the visitas generales also
had a remarkable strategic importance, since they were an excellent means of acquiring
information about provincial societies and their resources and institutions. They were
conducted with a view to improve the government of these ‘peripheral’  regions.29 Not
surprisingly, in the State of Milan a large (usually, the largest) part of each visita general
was devoted to the military apparatus of the dominion and its administration.30
20 Concepts like ‘Grand Strategy’, ‘soft and hard power’, or ‘sticks and carrots’ may prove to
be useful tools to investigate the history of Lombardy. The use of these concepts should
demonstrate that the State of Milan played a peculiarly important role within the general
framework of the Spanish Habsburg Empire and its enormous strategic efforts in the
course of the Cinquecento. For certain, the campaigns of Charles V and Philip II profoundly
affected and shaped Lombardy. Sixteenth-century Milan can thus be placed within the
broader picture of strategy as a highly-complex phenomena, one in which there was a
constant dialogue between internal and external factors. This is not to deny that modern
conceptions  of  strategy  are  very  different  to  the  understanding  of  the  term in  the
sixteenth  century.  This  difference  is  the  consequence  of  the  enormous  advances  in
technology, transportation, communications, logistics, and weaponry, as well as the great
changes  in  economic  and  social  organization,  not  to  mention  ideology  and  political
culture.31 
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21 Furthermore,  the international  system has undergone a deep transformation.32 In the
sixteenth century, we observe a wide variety of actors such as major and medium-sized
states, some of which were increasing in size and strength,33 though this evolution did not
follow a deterministic path,34 but also smaller polities, feudal lords, leagues, notables, and
so forth.35 Rather than being a competition between monolithic states engaged on an
endless circle of rise and fall, the exercise of strategy in the early modern period was
constantly  shaped  by  its  coming  into  contact  with  an  array  of  (supposedly)  minor
agencies or sources of power. 
22 In contrast,  throughout the nineteenth and twentieth centuries (or at  least  until  the
1980s),  Grand  Strategy  was  worked  out  in  relation  to  the  interests  of  sovereign,
territorial, nation states.36 Significantly enough, it appears that the last two decades have
seen the emergence of those phenomena that in certain respects invite comparison with
the situation in the early modern period.37 Globalization and the growing importance of
unorthodox and unconventional forms of conflict (guerrilla, terrorism, ethnic cleansing)
seem set to challenge to a certain extent the traditional strategic schemes of the ‘age of
the nation state’.38
23 Despite all the differences, a sensible use of texts and concepts belonging to different
times and places is neither intrinsically anachronistic, nor does it necessarily imply an
over-confident search for eternal strategic principles universally efficacious in any time
and place.  The  presence  of  relevant  analogies  in  different  eras  simply  confirms  the
existence of a few basic strategic issues of peculiar historical resonance, that is to say of
recurring factors common to different ages and regions.  By interacting with many other
local and specific variables, these factors shape each unrepeatable strategic situation.39
24 Throughout the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries Lombardy played a pivotal role in
Spanish Habsburg geopolitics. Remarkably, its importance persisted even as the strategic
priorities  of  Madrid  changed.40 Managing a  truly  global  strategy,  one  that  frequently
teetered on the  brink  of  military,  political,  and financial  crisis,  Habsburg  Spain  was
involved in sustained rivalries with the greatest European and Mediterranean powers
(France, England, the Ottoman Empire, the Dutch Republic).41
25 The strategic significance of Lombardy was clear to the Habsburg rulers,42 and must be
understood within the framework of  their  peculiar ‘global’  approach to international
relations.43 Theirs was a basically systematic strategic view, 44 in which the State of Milan
was seen as a ‘key and gateway to Italy’.45 Its transalpine position was, of course, a factor
in its international significance: the enemies of the Spanish Habsburgs – specifically the
French – believed that it was easily assailable and, indeed, throughout the late fifteenth-
and first-half of the sixteenth-centuries repeatedly tried to assimilate it. This aggression
brought a response from Madrid, which constructed state-of-the-art fortifications and
maintained considerable garrisons. In addition, the network was augmented by a handful
of outposts in friendly neighbouring states.46 
26 Lombardy was crucial to control and protect against any possible French intervention47
not  only  in  the  other  Spanish  dominions  in  the  peninsula  –  the  ‘danger  of  foreign
intervention’ being a weak point for composite monarchies, especially when grievances
accumulated48 –  but  also  to  police  the  critical  geopolitical  region  that  included  the
medium-sized  neighbouring  states  such  as  Genoa,  Savoy,  Parma,  the  Swiss,  and  the
Grisons and the various smaller polities in northern Italy.49
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27 Not surprisingly, in his Discorso sopra il Governo dello Stato di Milano (composed in 1592 for
the new governor of Lombardy) Giacomo Riccardi, the president of the senate of Milan,
defined the governor as ‘arbiter of all Italian affairs’.50 As a matter of fact, the governor and
the Habsburg ruling class in Milan – including Spaniards, but also Lombards and Italians –
were often appealed to by petitioners who sought their arbitration to resolve conflicts,
quarrels,  and  plots;  every  so  often,  the  governor  himself,  on  behalf  of  the  king,
volunteered  his  arbitration.  This  arbitration  came  in  a  number  of  guises  –  political
support, military protection, diplomatic mediation, or legal advice.
28  These petitioners constituted a wide variety of power, ranging from sovereign princes
and  republics  through  to  feudal  lords,  local  magnates,  communities  and  individual
taxpayers.51 Milan was also the hub of a complex intelligence network.52 Although the issue
lies  somewhat  outside  the  core  subject  of  this  paper,  it  must  be  remembered  that
Lombardy formed a part of a military-administrative network which incorporated the
other  Spanish  dominions  in  the  peninsula.53 Milan  therefore  played  a  crucial  role  in
allocating and moving resources (money, arms, horses, soldiers, officers, information).54 It
consequently  became  involved  in  a  great  number  of  Mediterranean  campaigns  and
mobilizations,  many of  which were  undertaken simply  to  avoid  major  conflict.  As  a
strategic plaza de armas, Lombardy served as a formidable deterrence to the enemies of
the Catholic King in southern and central Europe.
29 The fundamental strategic aims of Spain in Italy were threefold: first,  to achieve and
maintain  paz  y  quietud (peace  and  calm),  in  order  to  safeguard  its  dominions  and
hegemonic  position in  the  peninsula;  second,  to  be  able  to  employ  these  regions  as
strategic bases for its European and Mediterranean manoeuvres and campaigns; third, to
prevent any further escalation of military and financial commitments, as the burdens
were already exceedingly heavy upon Milan, Naples, and Sicily.55
30 Moreover,  ‘In  so  far  as  the  perpetuation  of  F07Bmultiple  monarchies F07D  also  depended  on  the
deterrent of coercion’,56 as well as on consensus and mutual interest,57 every now and then
the garrison troops of the State of Milan could be sent to other provinces of the Monarquía
to put down troubles.58 This is a clear example of the advantage that ‘the rulers of multiple
kingdoms possessed … over those of single kingdoms in the additional resources on which they
could draw in emergencies’.59
31 Habsburg  authorities  in  Milan  shaped  a  complex  policy  towards  the  Swiss  (and  the
Grisons),60 through treaties of alliance61 and other incentives: pensions were paid to Swiss
magnates62 ;  export  licenses  were  conceded  (especially  valuable  were  those  which
guaranteed food supplies);63 opportunities for employment in the large Spanish military
system were proffered.64 In addition, soft power was used : for instance, Catholic Swiss
students were attracted towards Lombard universities,  where they came into contact
with and (hopefully) assimilated Habsburg values and attitudes.65
32 The very nature of Italian politics forced the rulers in Milan to establish and manage a
widespread network of  multifarious  relations with a variety of  magnates  throughout
northern Italy and Tuscany – these relationships entailed engagement with not only the
most powerful and outstanding potentates, like the Savoys, the Farneses, the Estes of
Ferrara and Modena, and the Gonzagas of Mantua, but also with a wide number of groups
and individuals.66 Consider for instance the complexity of the political management of the
Emilian  region,  which  contained  feudal  lords  and  families67 such  as  the  Gonzagas  of
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Novellara,68 the Gonzagas of Guastalla,69 the Gonzagas of Castiglione, 70 the Rossis of San
Secondo  Parmense,71 the  Sanseverinos  of  Colorno,72 the  Picos  of  Mirandola,73 the  da
Correggios74 (whose fief  was for  the Habsburgs a  valued bridge-head in the Po valley
between Modena and Ferrara),75 and finally, above all, the Landis 76 and the Pallavicinos 77 
with their small but significant stati. The relationships existing between these families
and the government of Milan had typically begun in the Middle Ages,78 and continued to
evolve throughout the early modern period. 
33 By the sixteenth century the heyday had already passed for some of these dynasties, in
that they all had to face powerful and aggressive competitors such as the duke of Parma
and Piacenza.79 Yet  they  could  still  exert  substantial  leverage  on local  resources  and
communities who, in their turn, seldom played a merely supine role.80 By no means could
the  Spanish  ‘superpower’  afford  to  alienate  them.  The  practical  consequence  of  this
patchwork of jurisdiction was a complicated and shifting political relationship between
the Lombard government, these local actors, and a wide range of regional and continental
powers such as Paris, Parma, Mantua, Modena, Ferrara, Genoa, Florence, and the Holy
Roman Empire.81  
34 In this respect the conditions in the Ligurian hinterland were of supreme importance.
The  region  maintained  deep  connections  with  Lombardy,  Piedmont,  and  Emilia  for
economic, social, jurisdictional, and strategic reasons.82 Moreover, the Ligurian hinterland
contained numerous fiefs and independent jurisdictions belonging to prominent families
such as the Dorias,83 the Centuriones,84 the Fieschis, 85 the Malaspinas, 86 the Del Carrettos, 87 
the  Spinolas,88 and  the  Savoys. 89 Medieval  Lombard  rulers  had  repeatedly  controlled
several  places  in  Lunigiana,90 an  extremely  composite  and  strategically  crucial  area
situated  between  Tuscany  and  Liguria.91 There  Spain  held  the  valuable  enclave  of
Pontremoli - with its small but important garrison92 - which had been a long-standing (if
occasionally interrupted) Milanese dominion since the Middle Ages.93 The government in
Milan carried out a complex policy of patronage, deterrence, and diplomacy in Lunigiana
aimed at keeping as far as possible a status quo favourable to Habsburg strategic goals.
Above all else, this policy was designed to confront Florentine efforts to expand in the
region.94
35 The game of  chess  in  Lunigiana was  just  one aspect  of  the complicated relationship
existing between Florence and Spain. On the one hand (and as we shall see) since the
conferment  of  the  duchy  of  Florence  upon  the  Medicis  in  1537  they  had  usually
considered the Spanish Habsburgs as their most vital ally and frequently co-operated
with them to secure their financial, diplomatic, and strategic interests, complying with
Madrid’s wishes in order to accomplish common goals and strengthen mutual amity. In
this  manner,  Florence  secured  military  protection,  diplomatic  support,  and  even
territorial gains.95 On the other hand, although sixteenth-century Florentine rulers (like
all Italian ‘potentates’ of the time)96 could never ignore Habsburg supremacy, nevertheless
rivalries, disagreements, suspicions, and misgivings occurred rather often, and successive
dukes of Florence (even those who felt themselves to be intimately pro-Spanish) sought
to maintain a certain freedom of action from Habsburg influence and demands.97  In short,
relations between Florence and Madrid (and, by extension, with Milan) had their ups and
downs. 
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36 One of  the  ongoing  geopolitical  questions  in  Lombardy  concerned the  access  to  the
Mediterranean – a concern that had been a strategically-vital consideration for all rulers
of Milan since the Middle Ages (it is extremely revealing that first the Viscontis, then the
Sforzas frequently interfered in Genoese political  affairs  and repeatedly took hold of
Genoa and its dominion, dominating over the Republic for a few decades between the
mid-fourteenth and the end of the fifteenth centuries).98 The link between Lombardy and
the sea was a vital piece of the military system of the Spanish Monarchy in the second
half of the sixteenth century, as it sought to wage war against Protestant rebels in the
Low Countries.  In the 1570s the Atlantic route to Brussels became too hazardous and
Madrid’s  strategy  had  to  rely  on  the  Lombard  ‘military  receptacle’99 and  the  so-called
Spanish  Road  in  order  to  send  men,  money,  provisions,  and  armaments  to  the
Netherlands. The State of Milan thus developed into the hub of the Spanish logistical
network  and  communications  in  Europe.  Becoming  the  European  ‘drill  ground’ and
marshalling yard of the Spanish Habsburg Empire, it received troops who had sailed the
western Mediterranean and disembarked on the Ligurian coast, bound for Flanders. Of
course this system could also run from North to South: men were channelled down the
Spanish Road and into the Mediterranean theatre when Philip II found himself in major
campaigns against the Ottoman Turk.100
37 Given the strategic importance of the link between Lombardy and the sea, it is easy to
understand why the  authorities  in  Milan and Madrid  paid  constant  attention to  the
imperial fief of Finale Ligure, situated on the Ligurian Riviera di  Ponente.  Indeed, rival
powers – France,  Mantua,  Savoy,  Genoa – also found the control of the fief  to be an
extremely tempting proposition.101 In 1558 a popular uprising temporarily expelled the
feudal lord, Alfonso Del Carretto, and the rebels looked to Genoa for support. Acting with
Andrea Doria, the governor of Milan prevented the Republic from taking possession of
the  fief.  In  1571,  without  even  consulting  Emperor  Maximilian,  Philip  ordered  the
governor to occupy and annex Finale,  allegedly to  thwart  French ambitions.  On this
occasion the Prudent King had acted impetuously, and Maximilian’s emphatic diplomatic
reaction forced him to withdraw. Finally, in 1602 Spain took formal possession of it once
and for all, the Del Carrettos having just died out after their last member had assigned the
fief to Philip II.102
38 For a variety of reasons, the relations between Milan and Genoa assumed extraordinary
importance for Spanish Grand Strategy.103 Needless to say, geopolitics and logistics were
highly significant. All statesmen realized that a prospective attack upon Lombardy could
only really be relieved by sending help through Genoa.104 As we have just seen, in the final
decades of the sixteenth century Habsburg troops (and specie) were sailed across the
western  Mediterranean  and,  having  passed  through  the  Ligurian  harbours  and
hinterland, reached the State of Milan on their way to the Netherlands.105 Furthermore,
close commercial relations bound Genoa to Spanish Habsburg territories.106  The Spanish
were  very  much aware  of  the  tools  that  they  could  employ  in  negotiating  with  the
Genoese.  When  economic  and  political  conditions  allowed,  the  surplus  in  Lombard
agricultural  production  could  be  used  as  a  valued  diplomatic  weapon,  either  by
permitting or by threatening to stop the exportation of cereals to the Republic. Liguria
was poor in grain: Genoese hunger, actual or threatened, was a tool of Spanish diplomacy.
107
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39 Genoese  hombres  de  negocios (businessmen)  were  the  kingpin  of  Philip  II’s  treasury,
sometimes  running  serious  risks  in  their  efforts  to  support  crown  finances,  but
nevertheless  making substantial  profits  on their  dealings with the Catholic  King.108 In
particular, by purchasing annuities, by contracting public services, and by advancing big
loans to the governors of Milan or the ambassadors to Genoa,109 they played a leading role
in supporting Habsburg military efforts in the State of Milan and, by extension, the war
efforts of the Monarchy as a whole.110 Their influence stretched, therefore, far beyond the
borders of Lombardy. Several Genoese magnates were also feudal lords and landowners
possessing titles, fiefs, and real estate in the State of Milan or in the Southern kingdoms.111
Moreover,  the Genoese élite supplied galleys,112 soldiers,113 seamen,114 and a few military
leaders  to  the Spanish Habsburgs.115 Some of  these  leaders  occupied the first  rank of
command, such as Antonio Doria,116 Gian Andrea Doria, prince of Melfi,117 and Ambrosio
Spinola,  the seventeenth-century commander-in-chief  of  the Army of  Flanders whom
Richelieu  reckoned  among  the  greatest  captains  of  his  time  and  whom  Velázquez
immortalized in ‘The Surrender of Breda’.118
40 In all these respects, the co-operation between the governor of Milan and the Spanish
ambassador to Genoa often turned out to be essential  to the smooth management of
Madrid’s  Mediterranean and European strategy.119 Sometimes,  however,  even the tasty
carrots  of  business  and co-optation120 were  not  enough to  convince the Genoese,  and
tougher  measures  to  be  used  or  threatened.121 No  better  demonstration  of  the
sophisticated employment of the stick – of hard power – can be found than in the events
of the mid-1570s. In the summer of 1573 tension between the so-called ‘old’ and ‘new’
nobles  was  growing  in  Genoa.  The  ‘new’  faction  perceived  Habsburg  troops  passing
through the nearby harbour of Savona to be an act of intimidation orchestrated by the
‘old’ group, traditionally considered to be deeply connected with Spain.122 So tense was the
situation  that  Philip  II  actually  instructed  the  governor  of  Milan,  the  Marquis  of
Ayamonte, to make military preparations in order to be able to intervene in Liguria if
necessary. It was therefore no coincidence that German infantrymen in Madrid’s service
were billeted on the border with the Republic immediately after their disembarkation
from Gian Andrea Doria’s galleys.123 Thus, significant strategic pressure was exerted on
Genoa, one that was not too different from that exercised by nineteenth-century British
gunboats.  Paradoxically,  land-locked  Lombardy  played  a  highly-significant  role  in
Spanish naval policy.
41 Two years later the political disorder and competition between the factions in Genoa had,
if anything, intensified, threatening to jeopardize Habsburg strategic interests not only in
northern Italy,  but  across  Europe and the  Mediterranean.  The  ‘old  nobles’ repeatedly
threatened their opponents with Spanish intervention: after the events of 1573, it did not
sound as a totally empty threat.124 Philip II and his government opted for a conciliatory
solution to the crisis,125 but, again, a prospective deployment of Habsburg troops on the
Ligurian border was discussed in Genoa, Madrid, and Milan, and served to demonstrate
that beneath the velvet glove there was an iron fist. In March, for instance, Gian Andrea
Doria suggested to Ayamonte to move some Italian troops to Alessandria (closer to the
Ligurian border) ready for action, should Doria himself or the Spanish ambassador call for
their intercession.126 The ambassador, Don Juan de Idiáquez, who had arrived in Genoa two
years  before  as  Philip’s  special  envoy  and  with  specific  instructions  to  achieve  the
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reconciliation of the political factions,127 agreed with Doria’s suggestion and argued for the
immediate dispatch of a corps of Spanish infantrymen to the frontier.128 
42 Throughout the 1570s, therefore, the threat of military intervention from Lombardy was
exploited by the ‘old nobles’ to their own advantage. But these episodes also provide a
demonstration of  the sophisticated Habsburg strategy of  sticks  and carrots  aimed at
putting pressure on the interested parties in Genoa in order to facilitate the political
settlement  of  the  crisis.  It  is  worth  highlighting  that  ultimately  the  carrot  was
brandished: to cement both the reconciliation within Genoa and the hegemonic position
of the Spanish faction in the Republic, pensions and favours were bestowed by Philip II on
a few distinguished ‘new nobles’.129
43 The crucial events of the 1570s are just one example of how deeply the relationship with
the  Spanish  Habsburg  Empire  influenced  Genoa’s  (and  Italy’s)  political  evolution.130
Another signal example can be found in the events of 1537, when Charles V intervened to
‘curb and disrupt’ any attempt to restore the republican regime in Florence. The arrival
of  Sarmiento’s Spanish foot soldiers in Lerici  (a sea village on the Ligurian Riviera di
Levante, situated not far from the Tuscan border), the dispatch of German troops under
command of Pirro Colonna by the governor of Milan, the Marquis del Vasto, and Andrea
Doria’s limited naval campaign ensured that the newly-elected duke of Florence, Cosimo I
de Medici, could fend off the nascent republican revolt.131 A few months later, some of
these  Habsburg  troops  and  military  leaders  contributed  to  the  rout  of  the  poorly
equipped forces of the republican exiles in Montemurlo.132
44 The Stato dei Presidi functioned as a deterrent against neighbouring states and a lookout
over the vital Tyrrhenian sea. It was established formally as a Habsburg dominion in 1557.
Situated on the coast of southern Tuscany and governed through the Kingdom of Naples,
it included Orbetello, Talamone, Porto Ercole, Porto Santo Stefano, Monte Argentario and
– later on – Porto Longone in the Isle of Elba.133 A few miles north, the Spanish Habsburgs
very carefully watched over (and sometimes directly intervened with troops or assassins
in) the Tuscan harbour of Piombino, which belonged to the d’Appiano family and was
much desired by the dukes of Florence.134
45 Interestingly,  the  Habsburg  government  in  Milan  supported  the  garrisons  in  three
important  coastal  positions:  the  coveted135 Grimaldi  fief  of  Monaco, 136 and the  duke of
Savoy’s  fortresses at  Nice and Villefranche.137 As with Genoa,  the control  of  the food-
supply to Monaco was one method of exerting influence upon the fief, although many
other instruments or inducements were used.138  Nice and Villefranche were two precious
‘windows’ over the Mediterranean139 and bulwarks against French expansionism through
Provence, and in their investiture ceremony their governors had to pledge their loyalty
to the Spanish crown as well as to the Duke of Savoy.140 To be sure, Madrid, Milan, and
Turin were engaged in a relationship that was dynastic as well as economic, political as
well  as  military,  and  whose  repercussions  were  consequently  felt  far  beyond  the
Mediterranean  theatre  of  arms.  The  origins  and  characteristics  of  this  relationship
stretched back to the later Middle Ages,141 and made their presence felt throughout the
first half of the sixteenth century142 and after Cateau-Cambrésis.143
46 When war broke out in the Low Countries the territories of the duchy of Savoy became
essential to Habsburg logistics and so made the connection between Turin and Milan even
deeper.144 In  Piedmont  the  strategic  competition  between  Spain  and  France  was
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particularly harsh and encompassed open war,145 the possession of fortified strongholds,146
competition in securing intelligence networks,147 diplomatic links,148 patronage systems,149
dynastic bonds,150 the subsidization of the dukes’ military endeavours (not all of them, it
has to be said, particularly impressively planned or executed),151 and the race for economic
influence.152
47 Although the western front was understandably their foremost concern, the Habsburg
authorities in Lombardy certainly could not focus their attentions exclusively on the
western Po valley and the Tyrrhenian. On the contrary, they had also to attend very
carefully to the eastern border, where an unwieldy neighbour, the Most Serene Republic
of Venice, was to be managed.153 To this end, cooperation with the Spanish ambassador to
Venice  was  indispensable.154 Moreover,  Lombard  subjects  were  repeatedly  sent  on
intelligence  missions  to  gather  information  on  Venetian  strongholds155 or  Ottoman
preparations.156 But  the  government  in  Milan  also  strove  hard  to  induce  patricians,
citizens, and adventurers in Venice, the Venetian Terraferma (the Italian territories in the
Veneto region),  and throughout the Republic’s Mediterranean empire to embrace the
cause of Spain. This was done in order to secure the co-operation of politically active
figures and to recruit  spies,  informers,  and others who could be employed in covert
operations.157 Time and again, the documents refer to the gastos secretos (secret expenses)
dispensed in Venice and her maritime empire.158 These clandestine operations were an
essential instrument for Spanish strategy in general.159
48 The Venetian Republic was a major territorial  neighbouring state.   Relations between
subjects  of  Milan  and  a  range  of  organizations  –  the  central  and  local  Venetian
authorities, communities, families – were strong and operated on all levels. Links with the
subjects of the western Terraferma were particularly far-reaching: this region had been
under Milanese rule until the late Middle Ages. Many features of political, economic, and
social  organization  in  both  states  were  characterized  by  cross-border  connection,
although the extent of these links varied: security,160 intelligence,161 boundary disputes,162
banditry,163 fiscal  exemptions,164 the production and trade of  agricultural  and industrial
goods,165 smuggling, 166 rights of exploitation of crucial economic resources such as water
and woods167 – all of these issues are referred to copiously in the documentation. 
49 The Republic was also the greatest Italian military power,168 as well as the most influential
independent state in the peninsula (together with the Papal States)169 and an important
player on the international scene, especially in respect to the Ottoman issue. On the one
hand, therefore, as far as possible Charles V and Philip II tried to be on good terms with
Venice,  or  at  least  to  seek  a  modus  vivendi,  despite  occasional,  sometimes  profound,
misgivings and disagreements.170 On the other hand, these tensions increased in the mid-
sixteenth century – mainly because these were the years of Ferrante Gonzaga – and then
again in the 1580s.171 They again mounted during the first  decade of  the seventeenth
century, when the new governor of Milan, the hawkish Count of Fuentes, adopted a more
aggressive  approach to  Italian  affairs.  His  actions  affected not  only  Venice,  but  also
Florence, Genoa, Parma, and Savoy172 – again, a demonstration of the profound interaction
between the  states  of  northern Italy  in  this  period.  Moreover,  owing to  its  peculiar
geopolitics and business dealings, Venice (a most remarkable ‘centre of information, reports,
and spies’,173 together with its dominions in Levant) also functioned as a crucial window on
the eastern Mediterranean,  and was  therefore  seen as  essential  for  the collection of
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information  about  Ottoman  strategic  plans  and  manoeuvres.174 Significantly  enough,
among the Habsburg ruling class France and the Ottoman Empire were often perceived as
a combined threat – a perception which was proved correct in several instances.175
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RÉSUMÉS
Cette  communication a  pour but  d’étudier  la  stratégie  espagnole  dans la  Lombardie  du XVI°
siècle, en replaçant les développements politiques, sociaux et militaires dans le cadre de l’Italie
du Nord, au sein d’une Europe plus large et inscrits dans le tissu méditerranéen.
This  paper  adopts  a  comprehensive  approach  to  Spanish  strategy  in  sixteenth-century
Lombardy, one which places political, social, economic, and military developments in northern
Italy within a wider European and Mediterranean framework.
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